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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the original Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, made public by Herndon et al. (2013), on the 
basis of descriptive statistics and formal econometric testing. First, based on the public debt thresholds 
(30%, 60% and 90%) proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), descriptive statistics reveal that real GDP 
growth slows considerably as the central government debt-to-GDP ratio goes beyond the 30% threshold 
and that no further slowdown can be observed in the data as the debt-to-GDP ratio rises above 60% and 
90% during the periods 1790-2009 and 1946-2009. For the United States (1946-2009), the negative 
nonlinear finding completely disappears for any level of public debt, once reverse causality and influential 
outliers are accounted for. Looking at general (and central) government debt during the more recent period 
of 1960-2009 suggests that economic slowdown occurs when public debt moves above 60% or 90% of 
GDP. But it seems more appropriate to determine nonlinearity and the associated debt threshold 
endogenously. Therefore, in a second stage, we put the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset to a formal econometric 
test by employing nonlinear threshold models. Overall, our estimation results indicate that the nonlinear 
relation from debt to growth is not very robust. Taken with a pinch of salt, our results suggest, however, 
that there may be a tipping point at around 20% of GDP, beyond which central government debt has a 
negative influence on growth. Further (and greater) thresholds may exist but their magnitude is highly 
uncertain. For general government debt (1960-2009), the threshold beyond which negative growth effects 
kick in is considerably higher at about 50%. Finally, individual country estimates reveal a large amount of 
cross-country heterogeneity. For some countries including the United States, a nonlinear negative link can 
be detected at about 30% of GDP. For others, the thresholds are surrounded by a great amount of 
uncertainty or no nonlinearities can be established. This instability may be a result of threshold effects 
changing over time within countries and depending on economic conditions, not captured in our 
estimations. Overall, our results can be seen as a formal econometric confirmation that the 90% public debt 
threshold is not in the data. But our results also seem to suggest that public debt might have a negative 
effect on economic performance kicking in at already fairly moderate public debt levels. Furthermore, the 
absence of threshold effects or low estimated thresholds may not preclude the emergence of further 
threshold effects, especially as public debt levels are rising to unprecedentedly high levels. 
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1. Introduction 
Using simple descriptive statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argued for the existence of 
strong negative effects of high public debt on economic growth. In particular, they pointed out 
that economic growth slows down considerably if the public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90%. But 
some of the calculations presented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) seem to be flawed. Herndon et 
al. (2013) tried to reproduce the Reinhart-Rogoff descriptive statistics and uncovered simple 
spreadsheet errors and irregularities with regard to country and time coverage. As a result, the 
sharp drop in real GDP growth above the 90% debt threshold becomes a mild decrease and the 
strong conclusion, implied by the Reinhart and Rogoff finding, often used in the policy debate, 
that countries had better avoid the 90% debt threshold seems less obvious. 
Many empirical papers published in the aftermath of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) validated 
the debt 90% threshold. For instance, Cecchetti et al. (2011) find a threshold of 86% of GDP for a 
panel of 18 OECD countries and for the period from 1980 to 2010. Padoan et al. (2012) report 
similar effects for a similar group of countries but a longer period (1960 to 2010). Covering a mix 
of advanced and emerging market economies, Kumar and Woo (2010) finds a turning point at 
90% of GDP. Checherita and Rother (2010) and Baum et al. (2012) report similar results for a set 
of euro area countries. 
Yet, a new wave of papers started casting doubt on the one-size-fits-all feature of the 90% 
debt threshold. Caner et al. (2010) and Elmeskov and Sutherland (2012) show that the tipping 
point is probably lower: 77% for a set of 77 countries, and 66% for a dozen of OECD countries, 
respectively. Baglan and Yoldas (2013) identify a threshold effect of 20% of GDP for low-debt 
countries and a negative linear relationship between debt and growth for high-debt countries. 
Minea and Parent (2012) find a debt threshold at 115% of GDP. Panizza and Presbitero (2012) 
even argue that a negative correlation between debt and growth does not imply causality, as lower 
growth can result in a higher public debt to GDP ratio. 
Using a variant of the Reinhart and Rogoff dataset, Égert (2012) demonstrated that the 
negative nonlinear relationship between debt and growth is very sensitive to empirical modelling 
choices. But even if you take the presence of such threshold effects as a given, they kick in at 
much lower levels of public debt (between 20% and 60% of GDP). This paper seeks to take this 
analysis a step further by putting the original Reinhart-Rogoff dataset used in Herndon et al. 
(2013), to a formal econometric testing. We attempt to identify the thresholds endogenously on 
the basis of the testing procedure proposed by Hansen (1999) for the periods 1790 to 2009 and 
1946 to 2009. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of data definitions. The Reinhart and 
Rogoff dataset comprises central government debt. Yet more relevant for policy discussion is the 
general government debt, ie the consolidated debt of all levels of government included central 
government, social security administrations and subnational governments. The difference between 
the two public debt series can be sometimes very large. Finally, we also carry out country specific 
estimations on the Reinhart and Rogoff dataset to see whether the relationship between public 
debt and growth varies across countries. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides descriptive statistics of and a first 
visual glance at the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy. Section 4 
reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 finally summarises and provides some policy 
conclusions. 
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2. Stylised facts 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) use descriptive statistics to show the detrimental effect of high 
levels of public debt on real GDP growth. They show for a group of twenty OECD countries and 
for 1946 to 2009 that average GDP growth drops from more than 3% to zero as the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio increases above 90%. But according to Herndon et al. (2013), the average 
annual growth is 1.9%, and not -0.1%, when public debt is above 90% of GDP (Table 1). Using a 
variant of the Reinhart and Rogoff dataset
2
, Égert (2012) also found that the dramatic drop in real 
GDP growth did not occur above the 90% threshold (Table 1). In this paper, we use the Reinhart-
Rogoff dataset made public by Herndon et al. (2013)
3
 and our results are, unsurprisingly, in line 
with those reported in Herndon et al. (2013)
4
.  
While the averages computed by Herndon et al. (2013) do not indicate a negative real GDP 
growth for debt levels above 90%, their number still suggest that economic growth slows down as 
one moves above the 90% debt threshold. But annual data may be just too noisy to reveal us the 
true picture. We therefore computed 10-year non-overlapping averages for real GDP growth. The 
average of these multiyear averages, reported in Table 1, show that GDP growth does not slow 
down at high levels of public debt. In fact, there seems to be a deceleration only if public debt 
exceeds 30% of GDP. By contrast, GDP growth remains stable, or even slightly increases as 
public debt increases further. This observation remains valid for 5- or 8-year averages as well.
5
  
But as argued by many observers, whether causality runs from debt to growth or whether 
lower growth results in higher debt remains to be seen. An easy way to tackle this problem is to 
compare average GDP growth with past debt levels. Looking at average annual growth rates 
indicates that there is no economic slowdown beyond the 90% debt ceiling. In fact, GDP growth 
decreases from 4% to 3% as public debt increases from below 30% to between 30% and 60%. 
Nevertheless, GDP growth remains stable at 3% as public debt moves above 60% and 90% of 
GDP. This finding holds equally for multiyear average growth rates. 
  
                                                     
2
 Égert (2012) matched data on central government debt obtained from the data appendix of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) with real GDP growth rates available from the Barro-Ursúa macroeconomic dataset (Barro and 
Ursúa, 2011). The difference with the actual Reinhart and Rogoff data is that Égert (2012)’s data excludes 
Ireland and includes Switzerland and that the data series used in Égert (2012) are longer. 
3
 Available here: http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/31e2ff374b6377b2ddec04deaa6388b1/publication/566/  
4
 There are three differences in the dataset used in the paper and the one used by Herndon et al. (2013). First, for 
France, the public debt series has a sudden break in 1978-1979 (8.8% in 1978 and 31.1% in 1979). We 
decided to use the series calculated from the separate nominal debt and nominal GDP series provided by 
Herndon et al. (2013). This leaves us with missing values from 1973 to 1977 but we avoid the abrupt 
break, probably due to a change in methodology/definition. Another difference is that Herndon et al. 
(2013) use the Greek public debt to GDP ratio starting in 1970, while the series can be computed from 
1948 onwards. Finally, Herndon et al. (2013) exclude 1956 for the Netherlands, even though the 
observation is not missing from their background data file. 
5
 These results are not reported here but can be obtained upon request from the author. 
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Table 1. Real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP, 1946-2009 
  Level of central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
 
 x<30% 30%< x<60% 60%<x<90% x>90% 
Reinhart-Rogoff (2010) Average annual growth rates 3.9 2.9 3.5 -0.1 
Herndon et al (2013) Average annual growth rates 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.9 
Egert (2012) Average annual growth rates 3.4 2.4 1.9 1.9 
This paper  Average annual growth rates 4.3 3.2 3.2 2.2 
 
Average of 10-year average 
growth rates 4.3 2.6 3.1 3.4 
  Lagged level of central government debt 
 
 x<30% 30%< x<60% 60%<x<90% x>90% 
 
Average of annual growth 
rates 4.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 
 
Average of 10-year average 
growth rates 3.6 2.6 2.8 2.7 
 
The Reinhart-Rogoff dataset allows the assessment of more than 200 years for some 
countries. Annual average real GDP growth rates computed for 1790-2009 confirm the possibility 
of a negative correlation between central government debt and economic growth: GDP growth 
decreases steadily from 4% to 2% as government debt rises from below 30% to above 90% of 
GDP. But when looking at the relation between growth and lagged central government debt (in 
order to control for reverse causality), growth drops from about 4% to below 3% with debt 
exceeding 60% of GDP, but no further decline can be observed beyond 90% of GDP. For the 
period 1790 to 1939, Table 2 also shows that growth slows down above debt levels exceeding 
30% but that growth accelerates mildly if debt is higher than 90%. 
Table 2. Real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP, 1790-2009 
 Level of central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
 x<30% 30%< x<60% 60%<x<90% x>90% 
 Level of central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
1790-2010 4.0 3.1 2.5 2.2 
1790-1939 3.7 2.9 1.9 2.3 
 Level of lagged central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
1790-2010 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.7 
1790-1939 3.2 2.7 2.1 2.6 
Source: author’s calculations based on the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argue that the 90% debt threshold can be observed for the US 
economy: public debt exceeding the threshold of 90% goes in tandem with a decline in annual 
growth from about 3.5% to well below zero (Table 3). Our data replicates fairly well this finding. 
Nevertheless, this result is largely influenced by one single influential outlier, real GDP growth of 
-11% in 1946. This is well demonstrated in Table 3: when reducing the sample by one year from 
1946-2009 to 1947-2009, average real GDP growth in the 90% and higher debt regime changes 
from -2% to 1%. Moving one step further and comparing GDP growth rates with central 
government debt a year earlier eliminates completely the finding that GDP growth slows down if 
debt goes above 90% of GDP. In fact, average real GDP growth rates are very close to 3% 
irrespective of the level of central government debt. More generally, it does not seem to make too 
much sense to compute averages for the 90%+ debt regime, considering that, for the period 1946 
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to 2009, there are only four years (and four observations) falling into this regime (1946 to 1949), 
including the influential outlier in 1946.  
Table 3. Real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP, United States 
 
period x<30% 30%< x<60% 60%<x<90% x>90% 
  central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
Reinhart-Rogoff (2010) 1790-2009 4.0 3.4 3.3 -1.8 
This paper 1790-2009 4.1 3.2 3.3 -2.0 
  lagged central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
 
1790-2009 3.7 4.1 3.2 2.9 
  central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
 1946-2009 Na 3.4 3.3 -2.0 
 1947-2009 Na 3.4 3.3 1.0 
  lagged central government debt (as a % of GDP) 
 1946-2009 Na 3.3 3.2 2.9 
Source: author’s calculations based on the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Herndon et al. (2013) are focusing on central government 
debt. Nevertheless, drawing far-reaching policy conclusions based on central government debt 
may be misleading. In fact, what matters for public debt is the consolidated debt of the 
government sector (general government debt), which includes not only central government but 
also social security administrations and subnational governments. As Figure 1 hereafter shows, 
the average difference is a little higher than 20 percentage points but it can go as far as 50 
percentage points for Canada. For this reason, we also calculate averages using general 
government debt obtained from the OECD’s Economic Outlook 92 database. Data on general 
government start in 1960 at the earliest but for some countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal), they 
only start in the mid-1990s.
6
 For the sake of comparability, average GDP growth rates are also 
calculated for central government data matching exactly the time span of the general government 
debt series. 
As a matter of fact, average real GDP growth rates decline gently with general government 
debt increasing up to 90%, but it then drops from 3% to 2% as debt goes beyond 90% of GDP 
(Table 4). This important decline is confirmed when looking at GDP growth rates as a function of 
the (one year) lagged general government debt-to-GDP ratio but the smooth decline disappears at 
lower debt levels, where growth seems to be unrelated to the level of general government debt. A 
similar pattern can be observed when using multiyear averages. A smooth decline in growth rates 
occur when comparing debt and growth. But if we use lagged debt, the one percentage point 
slowdown in economic growth is evenly spread when moving from 30%-60% to above 90% of 
GDP. Let us now look at average growth rates in function of central government debt. Annual 
averages suggest a gradual slowdown in growth while multiyear averages indicate that growth 
decelerates considerably as central government debt goes beyond 60% of GDP (and not 90%). 
  
                                                     
6
 The data appendix provides more details on the time coverage. 
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Figure 1. The difference between general government debt (%of GDP) and central 
government debt (%of GDP), 2009 
Percentage point 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using general government debt obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook 92 
 database and central government debt from the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset. 
 
Table 4. Real GDP growth and general (and central) government debt as a % of GDP, 1960-2009 
 x<30% 30%< x<60% 60%<x<90% x>90% 
 Average annual real GDP growth rate 
General government debt 3.3 3.0 2.8 1.9 
Lagged general government debt 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.0 
Central government debt 3.3 2.8 2.3 2.0 
Lagged central  government debt 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.2 
 Average of 10-year average real GDP growth rates 
General government debt 3.6 3.3 2.8 2.1 
Lagged general government debt 2.8 2.8 2.2 1.9 
Central government debt 3.5 3.1 2.1 2.1 
Lagged central  government debt 2.7 2.7 1.7 2.0 
 
Another way of having a preliminary idea about the correlation between growth and debt is to 
plot the annual GDP growth rates against the debt ratio. The scatter plots presented in Panel A of 
Figure 2 are striking: annual GDP growth and the central government debt ratio do not appear to 
have any apparent relationship with one another for the sub-periods considered, perhaps with the 
exception of the period 1946-2009 where a little kink can be seen for low debt levels. The general 
picture does not change if public debt is plotted with a lag of one year (Panel B of Figure 2). 
Visual inspection yields a similar general impression for growth and general government for 1960 
to 2009 (Panel C of Figure 2) and for the US economy (Figure 3). 
Multi-year averages eliminate cyclical and other short-term effects, which may contaminate 
the scatter plots of annual figures. Therefore, Figure 4 plots non-overlapping 10-year averages for 
growth and central government debt for the period 1946-2009 (Reinhart-Rogoff data) and for 
general government debt for 1960 and 2009. Eyeball econometrics does suggest some kind of 
linear negative correlation between debt and growth, but no apparent threshold effects. 
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Figure 2. Public debt (%of GDP) and real GDP growth, annual data 
Panel A – Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, contemporaneous central government debt 
1790-2009     1790-1939      1946-2009 
 
Panel B – Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, lagged central government debt 
1790-2009     1790-1939      1946-2009 
   
Panel C – General government debt and central government debt, 1960-2009 
General government debt      Central government debt 
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Figure 3. Central government debt (%of GDP) and real GDP growth, USA 
Panel A – Reinhart-Rogoff dataset 
1790-2009           1946-2009 
 
Figure 4. Public debt (%of GDP) and real GDP growth, annual data 
Panel A – Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, 10-year non-overlapping averages, 1946-2009 
Central government debt  lagged central government debt 
 
Panel B – General and central government debt, 1960-2009 
General government debt      Central government debt 
 
 
3. Econometric issues 
We estimate bivariate threshold models, in which the effect of debt on growth depends on the 
level of debt. We use the testing procedure developed by Hansen (1999), which helps determine 
the threshold values endogenously through a grid search and which tests the different models 
sequentially against one another using bootstrapping methods. The linear specification is tested 
against a two-regime model. If the null hypothesis of the linear model can be rejected against the 
alternative of a two-regime model, the null of a two-regime model is tested against the alternative 
of a three-regime model. The two-regime and three-regime models can be written as follows. 
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T is the value of the threshold of debt in the two-regime model and T1 and T2 are the lower 
and upper threshold values of debt in the three-regime model. A grid search with steps of 1% of 
the distribution is carried out to find the value of the threshold variable (public debt) that 
minimises the sum of squared residuals of the estimated two-regime model. The grid search starts 
at 20% of the distribution and stops at 80% to ensure that a sufficient number of observations falls 
into each regime. But we also experiment with alternative paramtetrisation (30%, 10%, 5% and 
1%). 
The three-regime model is estimated based on two threshold values of the threshold variable 
that minimise the sum of squared residuals across the estimated models. The threshold from the 
two-regime model is held fixed and a grid search is used to identify the second threshold. We 
impose the restriction that the two thresholds should be separated at least by 10% of our sample 
observations. Once the second threshold is identified, a backward grid search is performed to 
identify the first threshold as suggested by Hansen (1999).  
We can proceed with the sequential testing of the models, once the thresholds are identified. 
Hansen (1999) shows that the null hypothesis of 21    from equations (3a) can be tested using 
a likelihood ratio test. Given that the likelihood ratio test statistic does not follow a standard 
asymptotic distribution as the threshold value is not identified under the null hypothesis, the 
distribution of the test statistic is obtained through bootstrapping with random draws with 
replacement. The bootstrap test is carried out using N=500 replications. If the likelihood ratio test 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of the linear model against the two-regime model (on the basis 
of the bootstrapped critical values), whether there are three different regimes rather than only two 
regimes is also analysed. The bootstrap procedure described above is applied to the two-regime 
and three-regime models.  
4. Estimation results 
4.1 Central government debt and the Reinhart- Rogoff dataset 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) imposed the 90% debt threshold without any formal testing. But 
it seems more appropriate, as argued earlier, to test empirically whether there are debt thresholds 
in the data and if so, where they are located. Before diving into the details, we have to emphasise 
that a serious problem with the correlation between public debt and growth is that any change in 
the growth rate of real GDP will have a mechanical effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio. Using the 
lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio helps circumvent this problem: in our bivariate setup, it is almost 
 10 
certain that lagged debt may have an influence on growth but not the other way around. Therefore, 
we focus on the interpretation of this relationship (lagged debt and growth) in what follows.
7
  
Table 5. Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, 1790-2009 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged  central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.184 0.248 0.060 0.082 0.054 
Coefficients                   Low debt 0.015 -0.022** 0.044 0.044 0.699 
                                       Middle debt 
  
-0.018** -0.018** -0.020** 
                                       High debt -0.006 -0.009** -0.006* -0.006* -0.007** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 27.72 71.99 14.27 14.27 4.40 
                                      Threshold 2 
  
94.27 94.27 94.27 
No. of OBS 2177 2177 2177 2177 2177 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth in  central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.002 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
                                       Middle debt -0.041** -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.010** 
                                       High debt -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.242** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 23.64 19.62 19.62 19.62 13.48 
                                      Threshold 2 52.98 67.86 67.86 67.86 155.00 
No. of OBS 2120 2120 2120 2120 2120 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
 
Our estimation results indicate that there is a negative nonlinear relationship between 
(lagged) central government debt and growth for the period 1790 to 2009 (Table 5). But there is 
uncertainty whether this nonlinear relationship includes two or three different regimes and where 
the debt thresholds are. Depending on the minimum number of observations required to be 
included in the outer regimes: the results indicate a two-regime model with a threshold at about 
30% of GDP if a large number of observations are included in one regime (30% of the 
observations) and a three-regime model with thresholds of 4% and 90%, if the minimum number 
of observations is 1% of total observations. Obviously, the lower the minimum number of 
observations in specific regimes, the higher the probability that a very low or very high threshold 
will be picked. But at the same time, the results may be less general because they will be more 
sensitive to outliers.  
The coefficient estimates are negative in the high-debt regimes but they tend to be lower than 
the negative coefficients obtained for lower debt regimes. This could imply that the harmful effect 
of public debt on growth diminishes with rising debt, but it could also well be the case that lower 
coefficients indicate that a one percentage point increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio means a 
lower rate of growth of debt for higher levels of debt. We therefore re-run the estimations using 
the (lagged) rate of growth of central government debt rather than the (lagged) level of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio as independent (nonlinear) variable and using, as before, the lagged public 
                                                     
7
 Appendix B reports results for the relationship between contemporaneous public debt and growth. The results do not 
differ too much from those obtained using lagged public debt.  
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debt-to-GDP ratio as the threshold variable. The new results seem to be more stable. Always the 
three-regime model is selected, with a lower threshold of around 20% of GDP and an upper 
threshold of roughly 60% of GDP. The coefficient estimates indicate that public debt higher than 
20% of GDP starts having a negative impact on growth. But the negative coefficient in the upper 
debt regime remains lower compared to the one in the middle debt regime, which is inconsistent 
with the Reinhart-Rogoff claim. An exception is the case when only 1% of total observations is 
required to be in the outer regimes: the upper threshold moves to 150% of GDP and the negative 
coefficient becomes massively negative in the high debt regime. 
Results obtained for the period 1946-2009 are broadly in line with the earlier results (Table 
6). The negative effect of central government debt on growth kicks in at about 20% of GDP. In 
some cases, there is another debt threshold at about 60% of GDP, but the coefficients above this 
threshold are lower than below it. We carry out the estimations again using the growth rate of 
public debt as a nonlinear variable. The results indicate the presence of a 20% debt threshold 
above which a one percent change in central government debt reduces growth by 0.04 percentage 
points. Furthermore, there is some but not very robust evidence for another debt threshold which 
is somewhere between 55% and 130% of GDP, beyond which the negative impact on growth 
grow much stronger. 
Table 6. Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, 1946-2009, annual data 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged  central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.140 0.054 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt 0.025* 0.028 0.050 0.238** 0.238** 
                                       Middle debt 
 
-0.022** -0.023** 0.047** 0.047** 
                                       High debt -0.011** -0.012** -0.013** -0.007* -0.007* 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 26.73 19.33 14.43 10.02 10.02 
                                      Threshold 2 
 
64.60 64.60 22.68 22.68 
No. of OBS 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth in  central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.220 0.194 0.024 0.108 0.070 
Coefficients                   Low debt 0.016 0.019 0.030** 0.019 0.018 
                                       Middle debt 
  
-0.026** 
 
-0.039** 
                                       High debt -0.040** -0.040** -0.063** -0.040** -0.187** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 24.54 21.14 13.25 21.14 21.14 
                                      Threshold 2 
  
55.11 
 
126.53 
No. of OBS 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
 
4.2 General government debt 
We repeat the above exercise replacing central government debt by general government debt, 
a more relevant measure for policymakers. The tests of nonlinearity indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a linear model cannot be accepted against the alternative of a two-regime model, 
and sometimes even a three-regime model is selected over a two-regime model (Table 7). The 
estimated thresholds appear to be sensitive to the parametrisation of the threshold models 
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(minimum number of observations required in a specific regime) and range from 50% to 90% of 
GDP when lagged general government debt is the nonlinear variable. By contrast, the results are 
more straightforward if the rate of growth of the general government debt ratio is taken as the 
nonlinear variable. In that case, the significant negative impact of public debt on growth becomes 
visible if debt exceeds 45-50% of GDP: a one percent growth in debt reduces growth by almost 
0.1 percentage points. These results are broadly confirmed by estimations performed on central 
government debt data even though the degree of uncertainty is much greater (Table B4 in 
Appendix B): a tipping point lies somewhere in the range of 30% to 70% beyond which a one 
percent change in central government debt decreases growth by 0.04 – 0.12 percentage points. 
Table 7. General government debt, 1960-2009 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged general government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged  general government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.026 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.002 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.148 0.102 0.092 0.008 0.010 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.037** -0.043** -0.029* 0.077** 0.077** 
                                       Middle debt 
  
-0.009 0.006 0.006 
                                       High debt -0.022** -0.022** -0.021** -0.012** -0.012** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 49.75 42.61 34.64 20.37 20.37 
                                      Threshold 2 
  
88.98 88.98 88.98 
No. of OBS 687 687 687 687 687 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth in general government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged geneal government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.442 0.292 0.136 0.004 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.106** 0.123** 
                                       Middle debt    -0.011 -0.012 
                                       High debt -0.063** -0.063** -0.063** -0.075** -0.075** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 44.59 44.59 44.59 17.63 16.79 
                                      Threshold 2    49.22 49.22 
No. of OBS 666 666 666 666 666 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
 
4.3 Individual country estimates 
Thus far, we have assumed that the debt-growth relationship is homogenous across countries: 
the same slope coefficients and debt thresholds are assumed to hold for the 20 countries included 
in the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset. Yet this assumption may be too restrictive given that public debt 
can affect economic growth differently in different countries. There are a number of channels 
through which public debt is likely to hamper long-term growth. They are as follows: 
 First, tax hikes needed to service a higher public debt crowd out private investment by 
reducing disposable income and saving, raise the distortionary costs of taxation, and 
are likely to result in non-neutral tax treatment within and across asset classes, thus 
amplifying distortions.  
 Second, soaring public debt will push up long-term sovereign yields in a nonlinear 
fashion, as the likelihood of default increases. High long-term rates crowd out 
productive public investment, and, more importantly, reduce private investment by 
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increasing the cost of capital. Reduced investment in R&D will have long-lasting 
negative impacts on growth (Elmeskov and Sutherland, 2012). 
 Third, public authorities, especially in countries with weak institutions, may decide to 
inflate away debt, and high inflation has a notoriously detrimental effect on growth 
(Kumar and Woo, 2010). 
Whether debt will have a nonlinear negative effect on growth, and at what level, depends on 
the importance of the interest rate channel. The overall negative impact will be given by the 
combination of the three channels. Against this backdrop, here we set out to assess possible 
country-specific nonlinearities by estimating threshold models for individual countries using the 
Reinhart and Rogoff dataset of central government debt.  
The results, summarised in Table 8, highlight several country specificities. First of all, a 
robust nonlinear negative relationship linking public debt and growth can be established only for a 
handful of countries including Belgium, Finland, Germany and the United States. The debt 
threshold beyond which the negative impact of debt on growth kicks in is very low, around or 
even below 30% of GDP. But the negative effects are very different: relatively small for Belgium 
but more important for Germany and the US economy. Second, for another subgroup of countries 
including Austria, Canada and Ireland, there is a large degree of uncertainty around the tipping 
point, which ranges somewhere between 30% and 70%, as it is sensitive to modelling choices, 
namely to the minimum number of observations included in one regime (10% vs. 20%). Third, 
there is no nonlinear relationship between public debt and growth in some countries such as 
Australia and Spain. In these two countries, there is not even a negative linear link between debt 
and growth. Fourth, in some other countries like Denmark, Italy and Japan, even though the 
presence of nonlinearity can be detected, the relation between debt and growth is positive in the 
high debt regime. Finally, in the remaining countries, whether public debt has a negative or 
positive influence on real GDP growth above a certain level of the central government debt-to-
GDP ratio depends on the minimum number of observations required for individual regimes.  
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Table 8. Country-specific results, 1790-2009 
Nonlinear variable = lagged growth rate of central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime: 20% 
 
Test of nonlinearity (p-value) Coefficients Debt thresholds (%) No obs 
 
lin vs 2reg 2reg vs. 3reg low middle high Low High  
AUS 0.28 0.42 0.068*     140 
AUT 0.00 0.02 0.027 0.093 -0.236** 18.94 58.15 104 
BEL 0.02 0.46 0.061  -0.021* 29.36  153 
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.096 -0.240** -0.605** 45.36 55.42 74 
DEU 0.00 0.00 0.074** -0.002 -0.159** 13.43 24.09 57 
DNK 0.00 1.00 -0.037  0.056** 40.53  83 
ESP 0.55 0.29 0.001     127 
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.020 -0.013 -0.113** 12.02 16.96 80 
FRA 0.00 0.00 -0.060** -0.006** 0.086** 35.33 70.44 92 
GBR 0.33 0.11 0.036     161 
GRC 0.00 0.00 0.059** -0.270** -0.003 24.57 110.74 105 
IRL 0.00 1.00 -0.208**  -0.133** 27.84  62 
ITA 0.00 0.13 -0.063  0.068** 28.58  107 
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.116* 0.062 -0.053 19.41 54.08 96 
NLD 0.01 0.00 -0.072** 0.075 -0.187** 47.87 70.69 100 
NOR 0.00 0.00 -0.023 -0.022 0.087** 21.57 26.99 112 
NZL 0.00 0.00 0.108 -0.064 -0.241** 37.11 53.45 67 
PRT 0.00 0.00 -0.018 -0.085 0.082 54.27 70.12 87 
SWE 0.00 1.00 0.099**  0.002 18.88  112 
USA 0.00 0.03 0.000 0.035 -0.159** 17.25 33.73 201 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime: 10% 
AUS 0.146 0.052 0.068*     140 
AUT 0.000 0.744 0.027  -0.198** 18.94  104 
BEL 0.052 0.278 0.089  -0.021* 18.33  153 
CAN 0.000 0.000 0.096 -0.135 -0.476** 45.36 77.59 74 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.073** -0.001 -0.164** 13.43 27.20 57 
DNK 0.000 1.000 -0.037  0.056** 40.53  83 
ESP 0.326 0.004 0.001     127 
FIN 0.000 0.000 0.020 -0.013 -0.113** 12.02 16.96 80 
FRA 0.000 0.000 -0.043** -0.006** -0.241* 70.44 105.10 92 
GBR 0.046 0.644 0.153**  0.017 38.15  161 
GRC 0.000 0.000 0.059** -0.270** -0.003 24.57 110.74 105 
IRL 0.000 0.000 -0.148** -0.060 -0.369** 65.50 77.17 62 
ITA 0.000 0.512 -0.136  0.075** 27.57  107 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.293** 0.096** 54.08 70.20 96 
NLD 0.904 0.000 -0.113**     100 
NOR 0.006 0.498 0.057  -0.010 22.34  112 
NZL 0.000 0.000 -0.090 -0.358 0.061 53.45 94.51 67 
PRT 0.000 0.000 -0.018 -0.140 0.088 54.27 71.69 87 
SWE 0.004 0.000 0.171** -0.067 0.031 15.62 57.07 112 
USA 0.002 0.042 0.000 0.035 -0.159** 17.25 33.73 201 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to contribute to the empirical literature on the identification of a 
possible debt threshold beyond which negative effects for economic growth appear. We analyse 
the original Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, made public by Herndon et al. (2013), relying on descriptive 
statistics and formal econometric testing. First, employing the debt thresholds (30%, 60% and 
90%) proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), we show using descriptive statistics that real GDP 
growth slows considerably as the central government debt-to-GDP ratio goes beyond the 30% 
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threshold and that no further slowdown can be observed in the data as the debt-to-GDP ratio rises 
above 60% and 90% during the periods 1790-2009 and 1946-2009. For the United States (1946-
2009), the negative nonlinear finding completely disappears for any level of public debt, once 
reverse causality and influential outliers are accounted for. Looking at general (and central) 
government debt during the more recent period of 1960-2009 suggests that economic slowdown 
occurs when public debt moves above 60% or 90% of GDP.  
Given that it is more appropriate to determine possible threshold effects in an endogenous 
fashion, in a second stage, we put the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset to a formal econometric test by 
employing nonlinear threshold models to investigate the presence of a possible negative nonlinear 
relationship between debt and growth. Overall, our estimation results indicate that the nonlinear 
relation from debt to growth is not very robust. Taken with a pinch of salt, our results suggest, 
however, that there may be a tipping point at around 20% of GDP, beyond which debt has a 
negative influence on growth. Further (and greater) thresholds may exist but their magnitude is 
highly uncertain. For general government debt (1960-2009), the threshold beyond which negative 
growth effects kick in is considerably higher at about 50%. Finally, individual country estimates 
reveal a large amount of cross-country heterogeneity. For some countries such as Germany and 
the United States, a nonlinear negative link can be detected at about 30% of GDP. While negative 
nonlinearities, surround by a huge amount of uncertainty regarding the quantitative effects, seem 
to be present in some, no robust or absolutely no negative nonlinearities can be established in a 
number of countries. This instability may be a result of nonlinear effects changing over time 
within countries and economic conditions.  
Our results can be seen as a formal econometric confirmation that the 90% public debt beyond 
which economic growth slows significantly is not in the data: the previous stylised fact is indeed a 
statistical fallacy. But our results also seem to suggest that public debt might have a negative 
effect on economic performance kicking in at fairly moderate public debt levels. Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of those effects and the precise size of the thresholds may vary to a great extent across 
countries. Furthermore, the absence of threshold effects or low estimated thresholds may not preclude the 
emergence of further threshold effects, especially as public debt levels are rising to unprecedentedly high 
levels.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Data coverage: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) vs. the dataset used in the paper 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff data in this paper 
based on Herndon et al. (2013) 
General government debt 
OECD Economic Outlook database 
Australia 1852-2009 1988-2009 
Austria 1880-2009 1970-2009 
Belgium 1835-2009 1969-2009 
Canada 1925-2009 1961-2009 
Denmark 1881-2009 1980-2009 
Finland  1914-2009 1975-2009 
France 1880-2009 1967-2009 
Germany 1950-2009 1960-2009 
Greece 1884-2009 1995-2009 
Ireland 1926-2009 1998-2009 
Italy 1880-2009 1960-2009 
Japan 1886-2009 1970-2009 
Netherlands 1880-2009 1960-2009 
New Zealand 1932-2009 1993-2009 
Norway 1880-2009 1970-2009 
Portugal 1880-2009 1995-2009 
Spain 1851-2009 1980-2009 
Sweden 1880-2009 1970-2009 
United Kingdom 1831-2009 1966-2009 
USA 1791-2009 1960-2009 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, 1790-2009, annual data 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.338 0.136 0.052 0.022 0.022 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.030** -0.032** 0.034 -0.039** -0.039** 
                                       Middle debt 
  
-0.024** -0.028** -0.028** 
                                       High debt -0.018** -0.018** -0.014** -0.017** -0.017** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 62.52 71.99 14.92 63.36 63.36 
                                      Threshold 2 
  
97.61 104.85 104.85 
No. of OBS 2239 2239 2239 2239 2239 
 Nonlinear variable = rate of growth in central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.014 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
                                       Middle debt -0.094** -0.104** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** 
                                       High debt -0.006 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 23.64 17.74 15.94 15.94 15.94 
                                      Threshold 2 62.52 75.07 97.61 104.85 104.85 
No. of OBS 2176 2176 2176 2176 2176 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
 
Table B2. Reinhart-Rogoff dataset, 1946-2009, annual data 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.052 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.106 0.212 0.122 0.012 0.018 
Coefficients                   Low debt 0.006 -0.044** -0.044** 0.104** 0.104** 
                                       Middle debt 
  
-0.026** -0.038** -0.038** 
                                       High debt -0.021** -0.026** -0.026** -0.024** -0.024** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 27.59 63.47 63.47 9.25 9.25 
                                      Threshold 2 
   
63.47 63.47 
No. of OBS 1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 
 Nonlinear variable = rate of growth in central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.053** -0.045** -0.032** -0.032** -0.032** 
                                       Middle debt -0.090** -0.090** -0.093** -0.093** -0.093** 
                                       High debt -0.196** -0.217** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 26.16 18.41 15.18 15.18 15.18 
                                      Threshold 2 55.59 59.57 65.76 65.76 65.76 
No. of OBS 1188 1188 1188 1188 1188 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
1.   
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Table B3. General government debt, 1960-2009, annual data 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = general government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = general government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.050 0.022 0.004 0.002 0.01 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.094 0.084 0.034 0.044 0.03 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.038** -0.035** -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** 
                                       Middle debt -0.026** -0.023** -0.050** -0.050** -0.050** 
                                       High debt -0.032** -0.032** -0.041** -0.041** -0.041** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 49.75 49.75 36.48 36.48 36.48 
                                      Threshold 2 69.74 70.48 60.39 60.39 60.39 
No. of OBS 708 708 708 708 708 
 Nonlinear variable = rate of growth in general government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = general government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.054** -0.054** -0.055** -0.064** -0.064** 
                                       Middle debt -0.126** -0.127** -0.144** -0.158** -0.158** 
                                       High debt -0.199** -0.204** -0.332** -0.429** -0.514** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 49.22 49.22 49.22 51.46 51.46 
                                      Threshold 2 67.10 70.48 96.03 116.78 127.90 
No. of OBS 687 687 687 687 687 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
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Table B4. Central government debt, 1960-2009, annual data 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 20% 10% 5% 1% 
 Nonlinear variable = central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.382 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.061** -0.061** 0.124** 0.124** 0.124** 
                                       Middle debt 
  
0.002 0.002 0.002 
                                       High debt -0.033** -0.033** -0.022** -0.022** -0.022** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 37.98 37.98 16.33 16.33 16.33 
                                      Threshold 2 
  
79.25 79.25 79.25 
No. of OBS 708 708 708 708 708 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged  central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.080 0.086 0.000 0.006 0.010 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.075** -0.075** 0.113** 0.105** 0.105** 
                                       Middle debt -0.038** -0.038** 0.011 0.008 0.008 
                                       High debt -0.027** -0.027** -0.011** -0.014** -0.014** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 46.45 34.23 16.33 16.33 16.33 
                                      Threshold 2 34.23 46.45 73.31 84.28 84.28 
No. of OBS 687 687 687 687 687 
 Nonlinear variable = rate of growth in central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.114 0.044 0.002 0.002 0.000 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.055** -0.041** -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
                                       Middle debt 
 
-0.068** -0.074** -0.074** -0.074** 
                                       High debt -0.148** -0.188** -0.276** -0.276** -0.276** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 54.43 23.64 16.33 16.33 16.33 
                                      Threshold 2 
 
58.86 79.25 79.25 79.25 
No. of OBS 687 687 687 687 687 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth in  central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP  
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.030 0.032 0.002 0.002 0.004 
H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.056 0.032 0.034 0.026 0.012 
Coefficients                   Low debt -0.006 -0.006 0.038** 0.043** 0.043** 
                                       Middle debt 0.039** 0.039** -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
                                       High debt -0.037** -0.037** -0.124** -0.124** -0.124** 
Debt thresholds (%)   Threshold 1 34.84 34.84 14.08 13.23 13.23 
                                      Threshold 2 49.56 49.56 73.31 73.31 73.31 
No. of OBS 666 666 666 666 666 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
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Table B5. Country-specific results 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime: 20% 
Nonlinear variable = central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP 
 
Test of nonlinearity (p-value) Coefficients Debt thresholds (%) No obs 
 
lin vs 2reg 2reg vs. 3reg low middle high Low High  
AUS 0.44 0.28 -0.026 
    
146 
AUT 0.00 0.00 0.370* 0.025 0.183 14.82 35.36 110 
BEL 0.01 0.10 0.149** 0.030** 0.055* 29.36 68.06 159 
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.117 0.036 0.078 52.22 68.11 78 
DEU 0.00 0.00 0.022 -0.113* -0.170* 11.54 20.87 59 
DNK 0.00 0.00 0.007 -0.012 -0.054* 23.41 45.86 89 
ESP 0.00 0.08 0.132** 0.018 0.061** 40.30 57.40 135 
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.421** 0.068** 0.216* 12.90 28.49 84 
FRA 0.00 0.15 0.155** 
 
-0.002 23.62 
 
101 
GBR 0.08 0.25 -0.031* 
 
-0.011* 68.19 
 
167 
GRC 0.00 0.98 -0.108* 
 
-0.030** 68.54 
 
112 
IRL 0.00 0.00 0.186** 0.041* 0.080** 44.17 77.17 70 
ITA 0.00 0.01 0.108 -0.026 -0.064 32.78 74.52 115 
JPN 0.00 0.96 0.418** 
 
-0.023** 19.41 
 
102 
NLD 0.00 0.79 -0.073** 
 
-0.038** 50.49 
 
106 
NOR 0.30 0.00 0.106** 
    
118 
NZL 0.00 0.00 -0.101 -0.005 -0.053 50.03 74.09 71 
PRT 0.00 0.00 0.288** 0.003 0.073* 17.34 44.43 92 
SWE 0.00 0.00 -0.177* -0.053* -0.098 20.86 36.13 118 
USA 0.08 0.14 -0.074**   -0.031** 36.25 
 
207 
Nonlinear variable = rate of growth of central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP 
AUS 0.00 0.52 0.041 
 
-0.312** 38.90 
 
143 
AUT 0.00 0.23 -0.075** 
 
-0.311** 16.79 
 
107 
BEL 0.00 0.17 -0.036 
 
-0.228** 38.53 
 
156 
CAN 0.00 0.00 -0.046 -0.329** -0.189** 45.36 66.97 76 
DEU 0.00 0.00 -0.024 -0.118 -0.335** 14.36 24.09 58 
DNK 0.00 0.00 -0.086** -0.023 -0.151** 22.79 37.74 86 
ESP 0.00 0.64 -0.014 
 
-0.150** 38.89 
 
131 
FIN 0.00 0.00 -0.075** -0.073** -0.160** 14.99 33.52 82 
FRA 0.00 0.00 -0.065** 0.004** -0.210** 59.42 98.30 96 
GBR 0.00 0.02 -0.033 -0.359** -0.206** 47.80 132.64 164 
GRC 0.00 0.01 0.006 0.021** -0.225* 51.70 108.24 108 
IRL 0.00 0.00 0.013 -0.306** -0.172** 27.58 65.50 64 
ITA 0.00 0.00 -0.231** -0.451** -0.041 28.58 84.64 111 
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.005 -0.108** -0.239** 16.83 30.09 99 
NLD 0.00 0.00 -0.197** 0.099 -0.116** 50.27 68.87 103 
NOR 0.00 0.05 -0.104** -0.114* 0.070 25.32 30.80 115 
NZL 0.00 0.00 -0.158** -0.565** -0.069 55.22 68.16 69 
PRT 0.00 0.00 -0.062 -0.182** 0.003 15.97 54.94 89 
SWE 0.00 0.00 -0.230** -0.131** -0.057 18.15 41.92 115 
USA 0.00 0.06 -0.003** -0.241** 0.017** 8.07 15.78 204 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
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Table B6. Country-specific results 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime: 20% 
Nonlinear variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
 
Test of nonlinearity (p-value) Coefficients Debt thresholds (%) No obs 
 
lin vs 2reg 2reg vs. 3reg low middle high Low High  
AUS 0.12 0.35 -0.007     143 
AUT 0.00 0.00 0.489** 0.046* 0.153* 15.24 36.45 107 
BEL 0.11 0.07 0.010     156 
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.059 0.038 0.086* 44.44 53.64 76 
DEU 0.00 0.00 0.061 -0.068 0.258* 8.36 11.54 58 
DNK 0.00 1.00 0.079*  0.001 21.82  86 
ESP 0.00 0.16 0.102**  0.018 51.89  131 
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.031 0.038 0.178* 12.02 26.43 82 
FRA 0.00 0.00 0.335** 0.029* 0.074** 25.67 81.45 96 
GBR 0.00 0.00 -0.056** -0.008 -0.026** 43.23 135.69 164 
GRC 0.00 0.00 0.341** 0.003 0.036* 22.43 121.53 109 
IRL 0.00 1.00 -0.191**  -0.031* 27.84  64 
ITA 0.00 0.63 0.206**  0.010 32.78  111 
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.096 -0.040** -0.121** 16.83 48.03 99 
NLD 0.00 1.00 -0.064**  -0.032** 50.36  103 
NOR 0.00 1.00 0.283**  0.201** 24.53  115 
NZL 0.00 1.00 0.002  0.029* 58.03  69 
PRT 0.00 0.00 0.267** 0.004 0.063 18.31 54.27 89 
SWE 0.00 0.02 0.209** 0.045* 0.146** 16.89 35.26 115 
USA 0.02 0.36 -0.119*   -0.021* 22.17   204 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
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Table B7. Country-specific results 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime: 10% 
Nonlinear variable = central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP 
 
Test of nonlinearity (p-value) Coefficients Debt thresholds (%) No obs 
 
lin vs 2reg 2reg vs. 3reg low middle high Low High  
AUS 0.060 0.044 -0.570** -0.037** -0.097** 12.46 71.79 146 
AUT 0.000 0.000 0.452* 0.017 0.175 11.93 35.36 110 
BEL 0.010 0.046 -0.081** -0.006 -0.031** 40.87 96.63 159 
CAN 0.000 0.000 0.172** 0.049* 0.115** 50.93 76.38 78 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.022 -0.113* -0.170* 11.54 20.87 59 
DNK 0.000 0.000 0.509** 0.024 0.132** 10.94 23.41 89 
ESP 0.002 0.116 -0.068** 
 
-0.025** 103.65 
 
135 
FIN 0.000 0.000 -0.573** -0.039 -0.172* 8.97 33.96 84 
FRA 0.000 0.098 0.109* -0.003 -0.023* 22.82 116.65 101 
GBR 0.102 0.106 -0.004 
    
167 
GRC 0.000 0.682 -0.108* 
 
-0.030** 68.54 
 
112 
IRL 0.000 0.000 0.186** 0.041* 0.080** 44.17 77.17 70 
ITA 0.000 0.188 0.218* 
 
-0.002 32.78 
 
115 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.252 -0.037** -0.107** 19.41 47.74 102 
NLD 0.000 0.026 0.153** 0.026 0.056** 36.06 58.95 106 
NOR 0.020 0.000 0.423** 0.191** 0.244** 16.39 27.78 118 
NZL 0.000 0.000 -0.057 0.005 -0.016 64.30 119.43 71 
PRT 0.000 0.000 -0.693** -0.104** -0.223** 11.64 34.80 92 
SWE 0.028 0.006 0.177** 0.014 0.055 16.81 47.91 118 
USA 0.068 0.150 -0.074**   -0.031** 36.25   207 
Nonlinear variable = rate of growth of central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = central government debt/GDP 
AUS 0.000 0.190 0.041 
 
-0.312** 38.90 
 
143 
AUT 0.000 0.198 -0.075** 
 
-0.311** 16.79 
 
107 
BEL 0.000 0.000 -0.040 0.095 -0.284** 61.07 104.89 156 
CAN 0.000 0.000 -0.066 -0.138 -0.479** 53.30 74.42 76 
DEU 0.000 0.000 -0.024 -0.618** -0.121* 14.36 35.32 58 
DNK 0.000 0.000 -0.043 -0.023 -0.133** 8.39 37.74 86 
ESP 0.000 0.170 -0.002 
 
-0.160** 35.27 
 
131 
FIN 0.000 0.000 -0.075** -0.073** -0.160** 14.99 33.52 82 
FRA 0.000 0.000 -0.065** 0.004** -0.220** 59.42 115.19 96 
GBR 0.000 0.088 -0.033 -0.359** -0.206** 47.80 132.64 164 
GRC 0.082 0.006 0.006 0.021** -0.225* 51.70 108.24 108 
IRL 0.000 0.000 0.013 -0.306** -0.172** 27.58 65.50 64 
ITA 0.000 0.000 -0.231** -0.451** -0.041 28.58 84.64 111 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.441** -0.127** 15.04 69.31 99 
NLD 0.016 0.000 -0.197** 0.099 -0.116** 50.27 68.87 103 
NOR 0.000 0.000 -0.115** -0.433** 0.004 22.09 35.39 115 
NZL 0.000 1.000 -0.138** 
 
-0.563** 68.16 
 
69 
PRT 0.000 0.000 -0.093** -0.413** -0.008 12.29 73.12 89 
SWE 0.000 0.000 -0.230** -0.146** -0.063* 18.15 53.06 115 
USA 0.000 0.086 -0.003** -0.241** 0.017** 8.07 15.78 204 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
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Table B8. Country-specific results 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime: 10% 
Nonlinear variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
 
Test of nonlinearity (p-value) Coefficients Debt thresholds (%) No obs 
 
lin vs 2reg 2reg vs. 3reg low middle high Low High  
AUS 0.040 0.100 -0.045  -0.002 74.18  143 
AUT 0.000 0.000 0.489** 0.046* 0.153* 15.24 36.45 107 
BEL 0.000 0.068 -0.081** -0.008 -0.035* 39.57 77.71 156 
CAN 1.000 0.000 0.020     76 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.061 -0.068 0.258* 8.36 11.54 58 
DNK 1.000 0.000 -0.016     86 
ESP 0.000 0.220 0.102**  0.018 51.89  131 
FIN 0.000 0.000 0.817** 0.097** 0.353** 9.15 26.43 82 
FRA 0.000 0.000 0.335** 0.029* 0.074** 25.67 81.45 96 
GBR 0.000 0.098 -0.056** -0.008 -0.026** 43.23 135.69 164 
GRC 0.000 1.000 0.209**  -0.005 19.54  109 
IRL 0.000 0.000 -0.283** -0.053** -0.079** 27.84 72.58 64 
ITA 0.000 0.268 0.206**  0.010 32.78  111 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.835** -0.010 0.036 11.50 70.20 99 
NLD 0.000 0.000 0.139** 0.024 0.056** 39.12 71.53 103 
NOR 0.000 0.006 0.416** 0.249** 0.313** 24.53 33.44 115 
NZL 0.000 1.000 0.061*  0.039** 119.43  69 
PRT 0.000 0.000 -0.385** -0.047** -0.079** 12.29 72.45 89 
SWE 0.000 0.000 0.297** 0.050** 0.158** 15.99 35.26 115 
USA 0.008 0.048 1.539** 0.003 0.042** 5.69 53.46 204 
Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth of central government debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged central government debt/GDP 
AUS 0.146 0.052 0.068*     140 
AUT 0.000 0.744 0.027  -0.198** 18.94  104 
BEL 0.052 0.278 0.089  -0.021* 18.33  153 
CAN 0.000 0.000 0.096 -0.135 -0.476** 45.36 77.59 74 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.073** -0.001 -0.164** 13.43 27.20 57 
DNK 0.000 1.000 -0.037  0.056** 40.53  83 
ESP 0.326 0.004 0.001     127 
FIN 0.000 0.000 0.020 -0.013 -0.113** 12.02 16.96 80 
FRA 0.000 0.000 -0.043** -0.006** -0.241* 70.44 105.10 92 
GBR 0.046 0.644 0.153**  0.017 38.15  161 
GRC 0.000 0.000 0.059** -0.270** -0.003 24.57 110.74 105 
IRL 0.000 0.000 -0.148** -0.060 -0.369** 65.50 77.17 62 
ITA 0.000 0.512 -0.136  0.075** 27.57  107 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.293** 0.096** 54.08 70.20 96 
NLD 0.904 0.000 -0.113**     100 
NOR 0.006 0.498 0.057  -0.010 22.34  112 
NZL 0.000 0.000 -0.090 -0.358 0.061 53.45 94.51 67 
PRT 0.000 0.000 -0.018 -0.140 0.088 54.27 71.69 87 
SWE 0.004 0.000 0.171** -0.067 0.031 15.62 57.07 112 
USA 0.002 0.042 0.000 0.035 -0.159** 17.25 33.73 201 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects. 
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